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The following examines the application of Islamic family law with regard to custody and custody 
rights in the Gaza city sharī‘a courts.1 Four objectives are pursued in the paper. First, it identifies 
areas of gender asymmetry in the legal code, which distinguishes female-oriented physical care of 
the ward (hadāna) from male-oriented guardianship (wilāya). Second, while examining the 
strategies adopted by men and women in claiming (or refraining from claiming) custody rights, 
the paper identifies areas of tension between the textually prescribed custody rights and their 
highly differentiated social construction. Thirdly, in fulfilling these objectives, it demonstrates the 
ways in which judges deal with various aspects of custody, and how, in the process, a knowledge 
of social norms overshadows the text; it will argue that today’s judges are still loyal to the heritage 
of Islamic jurisprudence, which asserts the concepts of fairness, consideration of the context, and 
protection of the weak. Finally, the conduct of judges is elaborated with reference to the notion 
of ijtihād (independent reasoning) in the contemporary application of Islamic family law. An 




The paper draws on the theoretical insights of Moore (1978, 2000, and 2005) who has been 
acknowledged for changing the paradigm of law and society in her seminal work, Law as Process 
(1978). In her book, Moore examines the duality of order and change in the social working of 
law. Order (law) always exists, but it never fully prevails. It leaves gaps of indeterminacy, which 
make adjustment, that is, change, necessary. The interplay between order and change provides 
people with sufficient space to adjust the law to meet a variety of objectives.  
 Custody, the focus of this study, is subject not only to the order of law, but also to the 
particular matrix of social relations within which individuals operate. In this context, it is 
important to emphasize the fact that unlike legislation, which purports clarity and universality, 
social relations are full of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and discontinuities (Moore 2000). The 
temporality of social relations is essential, which entails that indeterminacy exists as a pervasive 
quality of social and cultural order. Thus, people’s behavior might be interpreted in two ways. On 
the one hand, they try their best to control their lives by furthering the rule of order and working 
to fix and crystallize social reality. Such attempts at ‘social regularizations’ would ultimately 
produce what Moore calls ‘conscious models’, which are meant to organize and systematize 
people’s ‘customs and symbols and rituals and categories and seek to make them durable’ (Moore 
2000:50). This fixed model has its own merits; it allows people to live in relative stability and 
predictability, thus enabling them to plan their lives and interact with others on the basis of 
reasonable expectations of behavior. However, when the ‘conscious model’ becomes 
constraining, people tend to search for gaps in the model to counter its curtailments. They may 
even generate such gaps to accommodate new circumstances that have not been foreseen by the 
                                                 
1
 The chapter will not touch upon the changes that have been taking place in the Palestinian society since the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza (September 2005) nor analyze the impact of the Hamas victory (January 
2006) on the operation of sharī‘a courts. This does not underrate the importance of the ongoing process of 
spatial and social fragmentation within Palestinian society since the eruption of the second intifada (2000).  
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model,and thus engage in ‘processes of adjustment’. The ambiguous area between the pervious 
order and the new adjustment is the area in which indeterminacies occur. Moreover, Moore’s 
framework does not regard the determinate and indeterminate as fixed states, but rather as ever-
changing processes. What is fixed is only the continuous renewal. If ‘situational adjustment’ is 
adopted, repeated, and becomes a pattern in people’s lives, then it is likely to be part of processes 
of regularization; this implies that each process ‘contains within itself the possibility of becoming 
its schematic opposite’ (Moore 2000:51).  
 In the sharī‘a court, litigants often search for such gaps of indeterminacy, ambiguity, or 
uncertainty in the interplay of codified law, social customs, and the multi-referential framework 
of judges, in order to find space to express and materialize their needs and interests.2 In the 
course of their attempts, litigants often maneuver and manipulate these structures and sometimes 
succeed in turning them to their benefit.  
 Moore also stresses the importance of investigating the context within which the law 
operates and thus within which familial disputes are resolved. The source of the law used in 
dispute settlement does not matter, analytically, as much as the context within which the process 
of ‘amalgamation’ takes place. 
 In the particular context of Gaza, judges and litigants operate in ‘multiplex relationships’. 
These relationships ‘endure through the lives of individuals and even generations’ (Gluckman 
1955:20-1). Each relationship is part of a complex network of multiple bonds. The implications 
of any dispute between spouses reach far beyond their ‘private’ life in the sense that the social 
relations between their respective families are strongly involved. What makes the picture more 
complicated is the fact that these familial relationships (between the spouses’ families) are also 
part of the larger social setting of Gaza, in which the boundaries between kinship, politics, and 
economy are often blurred. The effect of any disruption in one aspect of these multiplex 
relationships causes equivalent or greater disruption throughout a series of other relationships. 
Therefore, it is often observed that the judges not only investigate the particular dispute 
beforehand, but also expand their investigations to include other ties that embrace many 
interests, and which may have further implications in the future.  
 Furthermore, within the context of Islamic family law, the duality of customary practice 
and codified law raises the question of how we should define law; or indeed what law is.  Moore’s 
concept of a ‘semi-autonomous’ social field, which deconstructs the single legal field into several 
arenas, was a revelation for sociologists interested in law (see Chanock 2000: xi). Moore points 
out that we should not apply the term law only to those binding rules enforced by governments 
or states. For sociologists, law is better seen as a social phenomenon that indicates ‘every form of 
rule pertaining to an organized group in any society’ (Moore 2000: 18). In her view, any form of 
rule that entails authority, an intention of universal application, obligation, and sanction should 
be deemed to be law (see also Pospisil 1971). The dichotomy between codified law and ‘other’ 
laws does not in fact reflect social reality. This applies to both industrial and less-developed 
societies. In the former, as Moore observes, although a presumed ‘rational’ state law is applied, it 
is smoothly sidelined on some occasions. Thus, in both settings, formal laws can work only 
partially; they have never controlled (and perhaps never will be able to control) every social 
activity.  
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 The first attempt to codify the sharī‘a in Islamic history, as Botiveau (1997) points out, took place as early as 
1534. Three centuries later, the Ottomans introduced commercial and civil laws in a process known as Tanzīmāt 
through the adoption of codification based on the European model. Later, the majalla appeared (1869-76) as a 
compilation of Hanafi civil law regulations (Welchman 2000). At the beginning of the twentieth century, ten 
years after the restoration of the 1908 constitution, the Ottomans introduced the first personal status code of its 
kind, known as ‘The Ottoman Law for Family Rights’, for the application in the sharī‘a courts. 
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 In Palestine, customary practice, as Welchman (2000: 6) contends, ‘constitutes a stronger 
controlling force than the [family] “law”’. Customary practices are customs defined by 
anthropologists as describing ‘patterns of behavior of a particular group’ (Gluckman 1955:236), 
or simply put, the primary forms of maintaining social harmony. They manifest particular ethical 
values of certain groups, but are nonetheless often based on hierarchical distribution of power 
and resources. Rights and obligations in the context of applied Islamic family law thus become 
subject to both. This is evident when considering the historical development of Islamic family 
law, which shows that it has not been entirely imposed from above, but has rather arisen from 
below, from communities that practiced rights and obligations, thus leading to their recognition 
(see Hallaq 1984; 1997; Gerber 1994; 1999; Esposito 1982).  
  When applying Islamic family law, judges not only use customary codes but also other 
‘Islamically informed legal concepts’. Goals such as the public interest (maslaha), equity (istihsān), 
protecting vulnerable members of society, and similar matters serve to ensure that the litigants 
receive what they identify as ‘justice’. Unlike the codified law, these are unwritten codes and 
require the discretion of the qādī to be realized. Sometimes, in its application, codified law may 
come into conflict with the judges’ objective of providing ‘justice’. When such a paradox arises, 
the judge works it out by employing the ‘legal concepts’. Unlike law, which is supposed to be 
clear, particular, and decisive, ‘legal concepts’ are flexible, permeable, unspecific, unwritten, and 
used by the judges to manipulate the code and surmount situations in which paradoxes between 
the written code and social reality are inevitable (see Gluckman 1955). Hence, the judges’ 
flexibility is generated from this multiplicity of references, or combinations of rule-binding law 
and imprecise principles, which in fact provide the grounds for the application to be flexible.  
 
The Legal Text 
Having introduced the theoretical framework of this study, let us now move to the legal text to 
review its gendered nature. The sharī‘a courts in the Gaza Strip rely on two legal references for 
the application of family law: the Law of Family Rights (LFR) of 1954 and the Book of Personal 
Status Rulings According to the School of Abū Hanīfa compiled by Qadrī Pāshā (BPSR) of 1875. 
The LFR provides fewer details than the BPSR on how judges should treat custody cases. This 
makes judges more reliant on the BPSR for their rulings. In organizing custody rights, the BPSR 
reflects a particular world-view regarding the status of the person: gender, age, lineage, religion, 
and morality are all important, but gender is the fundamental axis along which custody rights and 
responsibilities are distributed. The BPSR divides custody rights into wilāya (guardianship, 
authority, decision-making, and maintenance), which is exclusively the domain of the father or 
male agnates, and hadāna (care, feeding, clothing, and bodily hygiene), which is assigned to 
mothers or female relatives (see Welchman 1999; Layish 1975). This hierarchical division of 
custody into different domains is consistent with the gendered philosophy of law, which 
identifies fathers as the final decision-makers while mothers may or may not be viewed as care 
providers. 
Thus, the concepts of wilāya and hadāna cannot be conveyed accurately using the blanket 
term ‘custody’. The most salient feature of hadāna is that it does not entail major decision-making 
regarding the child. Its Arabic root hadana means to hold in one’s arms, to embrace and to place 
on the lap. The Lisān al-‘Arab gives a broader definition of hadana: ‘to nurse, to bring up or to 
raise a child’ (quoted in Zahraa and Malek 1998: 156). According to Samara (1989: 368), hadāna 
means ‘taking physical care of the child who is still unable to do so by itself. The one who has the 
right to do this is the hādin (the carer)’. In contrast, wilāya refers to notions of authority and 
decision-making. It is divided into two aspects: guardianship of a person and guardianship of 
property (wilāya ‘ala al-nafs wa wilāya ‘ala al-māl). The guardian (walī) has the right to exercise 
authority over both the person and the property of the ward.  
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The division of custody into hadāna and wilāya is distinctly gendered. While mothers 
cannot transgress this gender boundary, men may cross the limits established by the law, as we 
shall see later in this section. The BPSR devotes one full chapter of 14 articles to custody issues 
while the LFR has only one such article. Article 118 of the LFR specifies one matter of 
importance: permission is given to the qādī to allow mothers to extend the period of their hadāna 
over boys until they reach the age of nine and over girls until they reach the age of eleven, if ‘the 
qādī believes that [the child’s] interests will be served by that’. In this way, the LFR stretches the 
time limit of mothers’ hadāna by two years beyond the period previously stipulated by article 391 
of the BPSR. 
 
Litigating Custody  
 
The above review was made not only for its relevance to the sections below, but also to contrast 
the ideological construction of law with its highly differentiated applications. Let us now turn to 
the court to see how the law is applied in concrete situations, how rights are claimed and 
negotiated. How does the social context within which litigants file claims influence the process of 
litigation and ruling? The following ethnographic material was collected during 14 months of 
fieldwork in 2001-2003 and is grounded in the observation of the legal and social universe of 
sharī‘a courts.3     
 In litigation over custody, the legal text operates in a social context in which various 
complex webs of relations determine the outcome of the case. As in all family disputes, custody 
cases do not reach the court unless all other avenues for resolving the conflict have failed, 
indicating the degree of disagreement and bitterness between the spouses and their respective 
networks. As has been noted in a variety of studies (legal and anthropological), certain factors 
discourage individuals from going to court; financial cost, a lack of information or time, and the 
                                                 
3
 I conducted this research between 2001 and 2003 in the Gaza Strip, one of the two sections that make up the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israeli military forces in 1967. The occupation has made travel both extremely 
difficult and hazardous, especially due to multiple checkpoints and frequent Israeli raids on Palestinian towns 
and cities. Initially, my intension was to explore the strategies developed by the Palestinian women’s movement 
to achieve family law reform. But Israeli-imposed restrictions on movements hindered this undertaking. I 
decided to make only a few visits to the sharī‘a courts to explore the possibilities to save my research. The first 
visits fascinated me to such an extent that I could sit for hours just listening to the daily encounters between the 
judges and litigants. Gradually, I grasped the necessity of understanding family law dynamics before considering 
reform. I obtained permission from the chief judge to carry out my research in the court and started attending the 
hearings regularly. To try and blend in, I began wearing a headscarf and sat in the section reserved for the 
litigants’ family and friends. The change in the research focus was a blessing, for it was only then that I 
understood the difference between the making of law from above and the dynamics of its remaking from below. 
I was struck by the discrepancy between the dominant public discourse on Islamic family law and its practical, 
less ideologically charged application. The encounters with the judges, lawyers, and female litigants, as well as 
the process of continuous negotiation and bargaining inside the courtroom, led me to re-examine my biases and 
assumptions. After a few weeks, it became obvious to me that the social construction of law differs significantly 
from the law as published in books. 
I was particularly struck by the flexibility of the judges; they play a significant role in protecting women from 
abuse by their male relatives. Judges show sympathy and consideration; they do not hesitate to reprimand men 
for treating their wives badly, citing Quranic verses that call for women to be treated with respect and 
compassion. After deciding to continue to explore the application of Islamic family law in its entirety, I 
combined a partially open-ended ethnographic approach with semi-structured interviews with judges, lawyers, 
litigants, and court personnel. Litigants’ life-histories and those of relevant other actors were generated in order 
to gain more insight into the backgrounds and positions of those concerned. In particular, while processing the 
cases, I constructed some individual life-histories, recorded ideological positions, investigated occupational or 
economic circumstances, composed the dispute history, and gathered information on norms relating to specific 
actions. The qualitative data were combined with an analysis of the text of family law and its various 
interpretations. This paper presents only parts of the data and analysis generated in the course of the research 
trip. The full research is published in Shehada 2005. 
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shame attached to revealing one’s own private life to public institutions are only some of the 
factors that account for such patterns. In matters related to custody, the socio-economic 
circumstances constitute crucial elements in deciding the fate of the children since custody 
involves not only physical care (by the mother’s side of the family), but also financial 
responsibility (on the father’s side of the family). Some fathers (or agnates) default on the 
children’s nafaqa because of their (alleged or actual) financial difficulties. Instead, they offer to 
take the children to be raised in their homes, which they believe to be the more economically 
efficient option. As one claimant said: ‘My children will not cost me more than what I currently 
spend; they will eat from my dish and sleep on my mattress.’  
The picture is further complicated when a hadāna case concerns widows; they become 
subject to pressure emanating from different sides. If widows aspire to keep their children with 
them, they have to maintain a positive relationship with their in-laws, for the law alone does not 
guarantee them hadāna. Various court cases indicate that some in-laws file suit against mothers 
just because of their embittered relations. If the mothers are young, with a few children, their 
own families also exert pressure on them to hand over the children to their in-laws, since children 
would curtail the mother’s prospects of remarriage. Given their economic dependency on their 
families, widowed women show little resistance. The rationale behind this behavior is that sooner 
or later the mother will be legally or ‘socially’ forced to give up her children (see also Moors 
1995). Moreover, keeping the children with the mother would, in most cases, mean additional 
expense for her family. And due to the conformity between the agnatic responsibility set by 
Islamic family law and people’s perceptions regarding the distribution of rights and duties 
between agnates and the mothers’ relatives, her family would be reluctant to cover the expenses 
of a child belonging to ‘another’ family. 
 Unlike the formulation of the code, in which gender is the most informative 
characteristic, the actions of judges are based on principles related to serving the best interests of 
the child, given the socio-economic context in which litigants operate. Sometimes they conclude 
the case at the expense of fathers’ legal rights, sometimes at the expense of mothers’ legal rights, 
but in all cases, the eyes of the magistrate are focused on providing the child with the ‘particular 
justice’ that s/he deserves.  
The following case illustrates how the deputy qādī al-qudāh had to intervene personally 
when a divorced woman was faced with two difficult choices: to give up her children or to 
renounce their maintenance rights.4 The qādī al-qudāh’s advice to her, which was situationally 
embedded and socially informed, helped her to keep both, the children and their maintenance. 
Although she had to compromise over parts of their financial rights, the overall result was in her 
favor.  
 Adāla, a 35-year-old primary school teacher, had recently been divorced from Ziyād when 
I met her. He had left her with ten children, the eldest being a 15-year-old girl and the youngest a 
three-year-old boy. Ziyād married another woman who also worked as a school teacher. Adāla 
teaches at an UNRWA5 school, which pays a higher salary than government schools. After the 
divorce, she filed a nafaqa suit for her children and won it. Ziyād had to pay JD 25 (Jordanian 
dinars) for each child, the total amounting to more than 60% of his salary. The court had the 
authority to deduct the nafaqa directly, since he was a government employee. After a few months, 
Ziyād tried to escape this financial burden by filing a case for custody over the two eldest girls. 
His aim was to put pressure on Adāla to stop claiming the nafaqa. Although Samāhir and Ilhām 
were aged 15 years and 14 years, which meant they could legally be placed in their father’s 
custody, Adāla was worried that her daughters would become servants in a household where the 
wife was not their mother. Adāla did not want to give up her daughters, nor did she accept the 
                                                 
4
 qādī al-qudāh could be translated as “chief judge”. 
5
 United Nation Relief and Work Agency. 
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father’s dependence on her to finance her children. In order to keep the children as well as 
receive the nafaqa, she went through many difficulties. 
First, she had to prove that the father was ineligible to be a custodian. She hired Khālid 
al-Tayyib, who is reputed to be one of the best lawyers in Gaza, who acted on behalf of the eldest 
daughters and chose a strategy based on an incident in which the father had beaten his daughter 
in the street and torn off her headscarf. Khālid al-Tayyib brought witnesses to prove the veracity 
of the incident. He told the court: ‘The father is not eligible to be a custodian because he has 
beaten his daughter twice in the street. The most disgraceful act was that he took off her 
headscarf and uncovered his daughter’s hair. Samāhir [the daughter] is a mature Muslim woman 
and it is forbidden for her hair to be seen in public [‘awra]. That was not the act of a protective 
father. Men have to provide the female relatives who are in their custody with the protection that 
Allah has asked us to afford them. Failing to do so means that the father is not eligible to be a 
protector and should therefore not be allowed to get his daughter.’ 
Ziyād’s lawyer interpreted the incident differently. He told the court: ‘My client’s daughter 
is 15 years old now and she has reached the age at which the custody of men is needed. I agree 
with my colleague that Ziyād had beaten his daughter in public twice but he did not exceed the 
limits of disciplining children. The beating did not cause anguish. This is part of his role as a 
father. He wants to continue his duty of supervising his daughters, and to provide them with the 
best Islamic education. If her hair became visible during the quarrel, that happened accidentally, 
of course. Therefore, I request the court to implement the law in this regard and allow my client 
to get his daughters back.’ 
The case was heard by qādī al-Karmī. After hearing testimony over several sessions, al-
Karmī made up his mind: ‘In view of article 386 of the Personal Status Law, the father is not 
eligible for custody over his daughter Samāhir.6 This decision may be submitted to the Court of 
Appeal. Custody is something that cannot be divided. Therefore, the father who is ineligible for 
custodianship over Samāhir is also ineligible for custodianship over her sister for the same 
reason.’ 
The matter did not end there because the father appealed to the higher court. The Court 
of Appeal did not accept qādī al-Karmī’s judgment and sent the case to qādī Muhammad al-
Ansārī, who ordered Adāla to hand over Samāhir and Ilhām to their father: ‘The daughters are of 
the age to be placed in men’s custody … in accordance with articles 16, 18, 38, 39, 46, 48, 81 and 
83 of the Code of Islamic Jurisprudence and article 391 of the Family Law, we have decided to 
order the mother Adāla to deliver Samāhir and Ilhām back to their father. We took into 
consideration the following facts: (1) The father’s right of custody should not be jeopardized by 
the fact that he did not file a legal case earlier. (2) The witnesses have testified that the father is an 
ordinary, reliable and protective Muslim. Therefore, he is eligible to take his daughters under his 
supervision. (3) The testimony concerning Ziyād’s beating of his daughter seems to have been 
magnified by some witnesses. (4) The most important thing is that his daughters have become 
mature (bāligh) and need the guardianship of men. Therefore, we give the father the right to take 
them back and we oblige the mother to deliver them to their father so that they can be taken care 
of as stipulated by the shar‘īa.’ 
Khālid al-Tayyib, the daughters’ lawyer, did not accept the new judgment. He had to 
devise another strategy to allow the girls to stay with their mother. He exploited all the legally 
available routes. One semi-formal option was an intervention by the deputy qādī al-qudāh, so the 
lawyer arranged a meeting with him for Adāla.  She and six of her children went to the deputy 
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 Article 386 (of the Book of Personal Status Rulings According to the School of Abū Hanīfa compiled by Qadrī 
Pāshā of 1875) states that if there is no legitimate guardian, or if the guardian is insane, dissolute, or unsafe, the 
child should not be transferred to him. The article also stipulates that, in such cases, girls should be transferred to 
their (muhram) male kin; that is grandfathers, uncles in the mother’s line, and so on. Qādī al-Karmī, however, 
did not pronounce his ruling in accordance with this article. He settled the case in a way that would serve the 
interests of the girls and their mother. 
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qādī al-qudāh’s office accompanied by Khālid al-Tayyib.7 The lawyer explained the case to the 
deputy qādī al-qudāh and made it clear that Ziyād was not seeking custody because of his 
willingness to care for his daughters; rather, his action was intended to put pressure on the 
mother to forego her demand for nafaqa. The deputy qādī al-qudāh sympathized with the mother 
and gave her the following advice: 
I will order the court to reassess the case despite the decision of the Court of Appeal. The 
case will be heard by al-Karmī because, obviously, he is very familiar with it and his initial 
judgment was more in line with the sharī‘a than the second one. You have to give your 
former husband the impression that you are willing to give up your children. When the 
hearing takes place, let your daughters ask him to take them all. On our part, we will put 
pressure on him to take all the children. He has remarried and his wife is unlikely to 
accept your ‘army’, fearing they would ruin her house and life, especially your youngest 
‘monsters’. They are not hers. The best thing we can do is to send them to her and give 
her an unpleasant surprise. She has to get mad. This depends on your children’s behavior. 
Once they are there, they should be noisy, break plates, play football indoors, and switch 
the TV on and off all the time. In sum, they have to drive the wife crazy. Your children 
will return to you the next day. 
On the day of the hearing, the father and daughters were present in court. The girls stood 
in front of qādī al-Karmī and played the role assigned to them by the deputy qādī al-qudāh: ‘We do 
not want to leave our brothers and sisters. Our father should not choose whom to take and 
whom to leave. You should help us to continue living together. We would love to go to our 
father’s place but he should take us all. We will not go alone, either he takes us all or leaves us all.’ 
Qādī al-Karmī turned to the father and told him, ‘Now you have an excellent opportunity to take 
all your children to live with you. Your ex-wife does not object to that and the children want to 
live with you, so what is your decision?’ The father had no option but to tell the qādī, ‘Yes, of 
course, they are my children and I will take them all.’ Adāla sent all her children to their father’s 
house the same day. There, they followed the instructions of the deputy qādī al-qudāh. Within an 
hour of their arrival, they were returned to their mother’s house. 
The deputy qādī al-qudāh also informed Adāla that it was unfair to deduct 60% of Ziyād’s 
salary. She had to compromise in order to keep her children with her. She decided that it would 
be enough for her to receive JD 100 instead of JD 250. That was not the best deal, but she has to 
accept it as part of the comprehensive bargain. 
 
Synthesis 
The law operates on the supposition that both agnatic and maternal kin act in good faith with 
equal degrees of responsibility and decency. Yet, when examining its application, we find that it is 
more dependent upon people’s circumstances and motives than of any intentions. In practice, the 
agnates generally try to use their legal precedence to further their personal interests. While 
claiming their rights to guardianship, what is significant in the agnates’ behavior is their attempt 
to manipulate the law, both by keeping the rights assigned to them and by evading the duties 
attached to these rights. In particular, family law ensures the custody right of agnates and links it 
with their financial duties. However, in practice, agnates always adjust this provision to meet their 
objectives, which often do not match the intentions of the law. It is in this ambivalent area 
between fixity (of the text) and indeterminacy (of people’s behavior) that men manipulate their 
fixed rights. Agnates misuse the advantages assigned to them through the law’s gendered 
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 There is an important difference between the conduct of the deputy qādī al-qudāh and other PA officials: 
despite his ministerial rank in the PA hierarchy, the deputy qādī al-qudāh office is known to be easy to 
approach. 
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distribution of rights and instrumentalize children, either to gain benefit or to minimize their 
financial losses.  
Mothers, who are severely disadvantaged by the text, struggle to correct its asymmetry by 
holding men (fathers or agnates) responsible for their legal duties. They do this by using the 
means at their disposal. There is no normative vacuum between text and practice (Griffiths 
1992); rather, a social space exists, and it is within this space that people generate and manipulate 
it. The fate of children’s hadāna is a result of negotiation and social struggle between the actors, 
including the judges, who have to be accountable to a variety of ethical, social, political, and 
occupational domains.  
 Lawyers, for their part, do not limit themselves to the letter of the law; they also blend 
idioms from the sharī‘a with cultural norms to be used as reference points while presenting their 
cases. That was the situation in the case of Adāla, with the lawyer employing religious and 
cultural norms to disqualify the father’s claim of custody over his daughter. Since the headscarf is 
considered an essential aspect of women’s public appearance, the lawyer argued that the father 
would not be a suitable custodian because he had torn the headscarf from his daughter’s head, 
exposing her hair to public gaze.  
 The central objective of judges is to provide people with what they view as ‘justice’ (haqq). 
Judges, as argued, have several references at their disposal. Codified law is the written reference, 
while ‘legal concepts’ are unwritten. This study has identified concepts such as public welfare 
(maslaha), equity (istihsān), protecting the weak, customarily acceptable practices, and others which 
serve this purpose. These concepts are flexible, permeable, ambiguous, and unspecific. Judges, 
using diverse strategies, exploit the characteristics of these concepts to arrive at a correct and 
‘just’ (haqq) solution. The legal concepts used by judges do not operate in a vacuum; they are part 
of the historical, economic, social, and political context of their operation. They are also 
permeated by the interests, values, and perceptions of judges as well as of people. As 
demonstrated, the judges view themselves and are viewed (by litigants) as representing not only a 
legal institution but also moral and religious authority. In the case of Adāla, they plot with a 
female litigant to devise a strategy to keep her children. In this case, the judge not only 
reinterpreted the law, but disregarded its relevance.  
The qādī al-qudāh’s strategic advice to Adāla is insightful with regard to the degree of the judges’ 
embeddedness in the social fabric of Gaza. He is not mere implementer of the law; rather he 
exercises a degree of discretion informed by his self-perception as members of his community. 
Moreover, judges in general are well informed about ‘who is who’ in the community and have 
strong contacts with the community leaders and other influential social and political figures. 
Their decisions depend not only on the history of cases filed, but more importantly, on the 
potential consequences of their judgments on the individual litigants and the larger community 
behind them (Rosen 1989). The qādī al-qudāh’s ability to predict the second wife’s response and 
his willingness to provide ‘justice’ to the children enabled Adāla to keep her children.  
 The criterion of litigants’ ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ depends on the context within which 
the dispute takes place. The qādī assesses the wrongdoing of a litigant against that which is 
defined by society as normal behavior. Interestingly, the same trend, that is, placing the 
transgression of social norms within the framework of socially accepted behavior, can also be 
observed among litigants. When they communicate with the qādī, they often refer to his moral 
and religious authority instead of his legal position. Women frequently address the qādī as the 
father of Muslims, the protector of God’s worshippers, and so forth; and men do the same. Even 
when protesting the qādī’s interventions, they frame their objections in religious and moral 
idioms. There is a dialectic relation between the ethical requirements of sharī‘a in which the judges 
are well-trained, and the legally sanctioned principles of gender asymmetry. When judges find that 
strict adherence to the written code would lead to an unjust outcome, they strive to interpret the 
law in a way that makes it more in harmonious with its objectives. The case of Adāla is also 
relevant in discussing issues related to women’s agency. The concept of ‘agency’ is a powerful 
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analytical tool for understanding and theorizing on how women subvert or resist their 
domination; and whether, how, and in which ways women contribute to the continuation of their 
own subordination. If agency means choices to be made as a means of realizing one’s own well-
being, does this imply that the direction of women’s action should be ‘fixed a priori’ (Mahmood 
2001: 212)? In other words, when a woman decides, for example, to present herself as helpless 
and capitalizes on the judge’s empathy and his notion of protection, does such an action imply 
that she is contributing in some way toward reinforcing her state of subjection? Acknowledging 
women’s agency entails taking into account the specific historical and cultural context that creates 
the conditions within which women operate and make their choices. This practical notion of 
agency refers to their ability to cultivate their capabilities in order to attain their goals, despite (or 
perhaps due to) the injustices they have experienced. 
 The action of filing a suit, regardless of its outcome, is an empowering step. This was 
shown in the case of Adāla, who used the action of going to court as an integral part of her 
strategy and not just as a procedural action. Astonishingly, the judges, the very figures whose 
function is assumed to be to safeguard the law, supply women with the means of overcoming 
their difficulties and thus assist them in strengthening their bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
children’s guardians. Women, moreover, carefully choose which norms to invoke and in what 
forum to do so.  
The most striking feature of the observed case is that nothing was registered in the court 
record except a brief statement outlining the final ruling. In Adāla’s case, the qādī al-qudāh’s 
strategy was communicated behind closed doors. Under the circumstances, the only way to trace 
the daily ‘ijtihād’ (independent reasoning) of judges is to observe it on the spot. The protection of 
the child’s best interests stood in conflict with codified law, and therefore the qādī had to ignore 
the latter in order to carry out his duty as the provider of ‘justice’. Some might argue that this 
behavior is expected of those who have authority in the legal system. Yet the question remains as 
to what would be the impact of recording these interventions on the development of Islamic 
legal theory. If the legal system acknowledged such interventions and required the judge to put 
them down in writing, then the extent to which daily ‘jurisprudence’ contributes to Islamic legal 
theory would be greater. 
 This takes us to another point related to the debate on codification and ijtihād. The 
process of codification produced a written legal corpus that is poorer than those of the four 
madhāhib (schools of Islamic jurisprudence), in which contradictions are a built-in aspect of 
jurisprudence and thus allow for the adaptation of the legal judgments to the existing needs of 
society. The movement towards codification has confronted judges with an irresolvable problem: 
if, on the one hand, they apply the codified law as is, they inevitably injure both litigants and the 
moral principles of the sharī‘a through ‘unjust’ judgments. If, on the other hand, they go beyond 
the scope of the codified statutes, they can be held responsible for violating the law. To resolve 
this dilemma, judges rely on orality. Most of their actions, reactions, interventions and ‘violations’ 
of codified law are, understandably, not recorded anywhere. The fact that they have the authority 
to dictate the written record allows them to decide on the exclusion or inclusion of certain 
material; oral negotiations, the devices of certain judgments, out-of-court solutions, and in-court 
propositions appear nowhere in the court record. Thus, no one can trace the judges’ exercise of 
ijtihād. In view of this reality, the argument put forward by Tucker (1998), namely that the 
codified law has come to affect the subjectivity of judges, holds true as long as the evidence 
studied is confined to written texts or archival material. Codification forces jurisprudence to 
resort to orality, which means that there is no way to reconstitute the entire picture unless the 
researcher adopts an appropriate methodology based on the observation and recording of the 
daily practice of ijtihād. Another consequence of orality is the judges’ inability to rely on 
precedents. The lack of written precedents makes every case ‘new’ and to be dealt with not on 
the basis of what has been accumulated through court history, but on the basis of the 
accumulated experience of the individual qādī alone. Contemporary ijtihād is obscured by the 
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recourse to orality. Innovations are covered up and changes in the system concealed. Every qādī, 
therefore, is a universe unto itself, whose judgments are made subjectively and transmitted orally. 
Ra’y (subjective reasoning), which is one of the foundations of ijtihād, is obscured through orality 
and thus no legacy (turāth) is allowed to accumulate. This leads to stagnation of the text on the 
one hand, and proliferation of oral ijtihād on the other.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed how the gender-based double standard of hadāna is articulated in the 
text. However, when we turn to the practice we attain greater insight into how the law is socially 
constructed. This requires considering people’s counter-consensual actions, for law is not 
transmitted from legal authorities to litigants by ‘cables’. Communication between the legal 
authorities and citizens is rarely unmediated (Griffiths 1992). How, the paper inquired, did the 
actors in the court perceive the law? What sorts of accommodations or modifications were made 
by actors in the court, be they decision-makers or litigants? In which areas did adjustment or 
non-adjustment occur, and why? Which ambivalences in codified law allowed people to adjust 
situationally? How do gender, social status, and class play out, together or separately, in the 
process of adjustment? Which historical or temporal indeterminacies allowed and still allow 
people to adjust the law? In particular, the paper, while comparing the relevant text with its 
practice, did not seek to examine whether family law is effectively applied or obeyed; rather, the 
main aim was to investigate how it worked sociologically. It was in this examination that the law 
appeared less influential than assumed by social engineering theorists.8 Moreover, the people’s 
conduct not only suggests a difference between text and practice but also directs our attention to 
the quality of this difference: the text is often more conservative than the practice. This confirms 
the argument put forward by Dwyer (1990), which emphasizes the importance of reading the text 
through the eyes of the people rather than through an ideological presentation of Islamic law. 
Rules, as Moore (2005) points out, do not always rule. The sociology of law acknowledges that 
law operates in a culturally specific domain and within a context of social relations full of 
inconsistencies, ambiguities, and discontinuities. This approach has indeed been useful in Gaza. 
Recognizing the temporality of people’s circumstances is essential in light of the indeterminacy 
that exists as a pervasive reality for people who endure enormous instability under the brutal and 
continuous Israeli occupation. The ethnography on the judicial reasoning in this particular corner 
of Palestine may prove useful, to the extent that it illustrates the capacity of judges to create a 
legal framework that can encompass multiple sources of law, amid litigants’ shifting strategies. 
The disparity between the discretion of the judges and the purported binding code raises a 
double question: In whose interest does the judge rule in family law cases? What does it mean to 
adhere to the notion of rule of law when the judge decides as he sees fit? The answer – as the 
case of Adāla indicates – is that the judges’ discretion is able to serve the best interests of the 
weaker party and the rule of law is once again a notion that requires careful revision.  
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